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NOTES AND COMMENTS
contract was with the firm alone, a contract which is made by statute a
joint and several obligation of the several partners, is by that statute
entitled not only to priority in the firm assets as a firm creditor, but
also to parity of treatment in the separate partners' individual estates
with the partners' personal creditors. The rule of marshalling assets
contained in G.S. § 59-70(h) does not deny firm creditors rights also
as creditors of the separate partners; but it does deny them the pre-
ferred position as to individual assets which it grants to the personal
creditors of the partners (just as it gives firm creditors a like preference
as to firm assets).
The statute as to joint and several liability is procedural only.27
The firm creditor with no more than a joint obligation is in truth a
creditor of the separate partners; but in order to enforce his claim he
must join them all as defendants. Once he has overcome this procedural
obstacle and has his judgment, he may collect the whole amount out of
property of any one of the judgment debtors, exactly as if his claim were
joint and several.28  There seems to be no sound reason for any dif-
ference between a joint and several creditor, as to their substantive
rights.
The theory of the Walston case, however, is hardly consistent with
this view. Until the court deals with the problem again, it cannot be
concluded whether the Casey decision has resulted in a liberalization





In Reed v. Elmore,' a landowner subdivided a tract of land into
seven lots and sold five of them with no restrictions as to use. She
conveyed Lot No. 3 to plaintiff by deed stipulating that the land therein
conveyed should be subject to the restriction that no structure be erected
thereon by the grantee within a stipulated distance from the public
road. This deed, which was properly recorded by plaintiff, contained
the further provision, "This restriction shall likewise apply to Lot No.
4, retained by the grantor, said Lot No. 4 being adjacent to lands hereby
conveyed." Subsequently, the owner sold this adjacent Lot No. 4,
which defendant had obtained by mesne conveyances, the deed contain-
ing no reference to the restriction. The plaintiff covenantee, owner of
CRANE, PARTNERSnIP 519 (2d ed. 1952).
2 WLmsTON, CONTRACTs § 316 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 4 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 928(1951).
1246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957).
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Lot No. 3, brought action against the defendant, owner of Lot No. 4,
to restrain him from building on Lot No. 4 in contravention of the
restriction. The court held that the restrictive covenant in plaintiff's
recorded deed was constructive notice to the subsequent purchasers of
Lot No. 4, and that the restriction would'be enforced as between this
covenantee and this defendant even though no deed to Lot No. 4 con-
tained reference to such restriction.
The ratio decidendi of the court was that if this restrictive covenant
is to be enforced, the parties to the contract must have intended it to
impose a benefit on the landowner of Lot No. 3 and a burden on the
landowner of Lot No. 4; the existence of a uniform plan of development
evidences such an intention, but the absence of a uniform plan does not
preclude the finding of that intention. 2 Hence, the court construed the
restriction as clearly indicating an intention to impose "mutual restrictive
servitudes" on the land.
Although the court did not so state, it appears that the decision was
reached by applying the doctrine of equitable servitudes. Generally,
this doctrine works on the theory that the restrictive covenant gives the
covenantee an equitable property right in the land of the covenantor.3
In spite of the fact that the benefit and the burden are said to be ap-
purtenant to the land and to run with it,4 the real question is not whether
the covenant runs with the land, but whether the purchaser took the
land with notice, actual or constructive, of the covenant contract of the
grantor with respect to its use.5
This doctrine has developed in courts of equity as the means by
which the homeowner secures to himself a desirable place to live and
the real estate developer secures to himself an enhanced value for his
land.6  The doctrine has been applied in two classes of cases. Its
most frequent application has been in the cases involving a landowner
seeking to develop a particular area in accordance with a uniform plan.
However, it is generally held that a uniform plan is not a sine qua non
for sustaining the validity of a restrictive covenant,7 and that the
'Id. at 226, 98 S.E.2d at 364.
'Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546 (1876); CLARK, COVENANTS AND OTHER
INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND c. 6 (2d ed. 1947) ; Reno, The Enforcement of
Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 VA. L. Rav. 951, 1067 (1942). Another theory
offered for this doctrine is that equity is merely enforcing a contract by a form
of specific performance. De Gray v. Monmouth Beach Club House Co., 50 N.. Eq.
329, 24 Atl. 388 (Ch. 1892) ; CLARK, op. cit. supra at 172; Reno, supra, at 973-7
'Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 139 Atl. 508 (1927); Hayslett v. Shell
Petroleum Corp., 38 Ohio App. 164, 175 N.E. 888 (1930) ; CLARK, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 175.
Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
'Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
' Osius v. Barton, supra note 6; Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375,
378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940) (dictum). The existence of a general scheme is
necessary for the enforcement of a restriction by a prior grantee against a subse-
quent grantee where there is a restriction in each grantee's deed but no express
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restrictions are enforced because rights have been or are about to be
invaded.8  In the principal case, the court adopted this view. The
three dissenting judges based their objections on the fact that analagous
North Carolina decisions9 in this area had refused to enforce similar
restrictive covenants in the absence of a uniform plan. But it would
appear, from analysis of those decisions, that none of them involved an
express covenant to bind the land retained by the grantor.1 0
A less frequent but equally important application of this doctrine
is in the group of cases involving restrictions on only one or two
parcels of land. In this group of cases, however, the complainant must
show that there was a covenant to bind the remaining land and that the
subsequent purchaser took that land with notice of the covenant.:"
Although notice is recognized as essential, the courts have not agreed
on what is sufficient to constitute record notice to the subsequent
purchaser. The weight of authority now appears to be that the owner
of land is bound by the restrictions only if they appear in some deed of
record to the same land in the conveyances to himself and his direct
predecessors in title.' 2 This view, recognizing the practical limitations
of title searching, only requires the searcher to examine deeds involving
the particular lot in question.' 3
The other view, which appears to be the minority view, is that
recorded deeds to other tracts of land give notice of the restrictions
placed therein on the other lots retained by the grantor.' 4 This is the
view which the court in the principal case adopted. In reaching its
decision, the court relied on two North Carolina cases, Starmount Co. v.
Memorial Park5 and Waldrop v. Brevard,'6 as indicating an inclination
toward this view. From an analysis of the decisions, however, it ap-
covenant by the grantor to bind the remaining land. Beattie v. Howell, 98 N.J.
Eq. 163, 129 Atl. 822 (Ch. 1925) ; Bessette v. Guarino, 128 A.2d 839 (R.I. 1957).
Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289 (1865).
Craven County v. Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 75 S.E.2d 620 (1953) ; Sedherry
v. Parsons, 232 N.C. 707, 62 S.E.2d 88 (1950) ; Humphrey v. Beall, 215 N.C. 15,
200 S.E. 918 (1939).
10 See note 9 supra.
"Denhardt v. De Roo, 295 Mich. 223, 294 N.W. 163 (1940) ; Hart v. Little,
103 Misc. 320, 171 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1918) ; Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289 (1865).
"'Hancock v. Gummi, 151 Ga. 667, 107 S.E. 872 (1921) ; Glorieux v. Lighthipe,
88 N.J.L. 199, 96 Atl. 94 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915); Buffalo Academy of the
Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., 267 N.Y. 242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935); Hayslett v.
Shell Petroleum Corp., 38 Ohio App. 164, 175 N.E. 888 (1930) ; CLARK, COVENANTS
AND OTHER INTERESTS RUxNING WITH LAND 183 (2d ed. 1947) ; Philbrick, Limits
of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 171 (1944).
" See cases cited note 12 supra; Philbrick, supra note 12, at 175; Note, 21
CORNELL L.Q. 479 (1936).
" Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 Atl. 216 (1915); King v. Union Trust Co.,
226 Mo. 351, 126 S.W. 415 (1910); Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 154 Atl. 299(1931) ; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 567 d (2d ed. 1920).
1t233 N.C. 613, 65 S.E.2d 134 (1951).
's 233 N.C. 26, 62 S.E.2t 512 (1950).
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pears that such is not the case. The Starmount case involved a re-
strictive covenant which was placed in a deed to a portion of the same
tract of land purchased by the defendant. Thus it would seem that this
case merely followed the majority view. The Brevard case involved
an easement and a covenant not to sue, placed in a deed by a common
grantor to another tract of land. The subsequent purchaser contended
that a deed could not be record notice if it were to a parcel of land other
than the one bought. Although it was held to be record notice, the
court there said, "This position might be well taken if we were dealing
with restrictive covenants rather than an easement. 1 "
Then turning to other authorities, the court relied on a statement by
Tiffany,18 and an annotation in the American Law Report.10 These
authorities lend support to the view adopted by the court and to its as-
sertion that this is the majority view. However, the statement by Mr.
Tiffany was written before 1920 and the annotation was written in
1922. Since that time, it seems that the weight of authority has shifted.20
Hence, it would appear that the decision as to the enforcement of
restrictions absent a uniform plan is in line with the weight of authority,
while the decision as to what constitutes record notice is in accord with
the present minority view.
JIMMY W. KISER
Taxation-Effect of North Carolina Inheritance Tax on a
Will Compromise Agreement
Testatrix devised several tracts of land located in North Carolina to
A, B, and C, a niece and two nephews, in fee simple. D, another niece
who was specifically excluded from the will, threatened to file caveat to
the probate of the will. In return for the promises df A, B, and C to
convey one-fourth of the property to D, she did not file caveat and the
will was admitted to probate. The executor paid the inheritance tax
on the basis that there were four beneficiaries in accordance with the
compromise agreement. The North Carolina Commissioner of Revenue
filed a tax judgment against the beneficiaries for an additional assessment
computed on the basis of the will with three beneficiaries instead of four.
A partition sale of one parcel of the land was made by a court-appointed
commissioner and the additional assessment was paid. A, B, and C then
brought suit against E, a purchaser from D of the parcel of land which
was sold, to compel payment of a proportionate share of the inheritance
tax. It was held that the liability for the tax is on those who are in-
11233 N.C. at 30.
182 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 14, at 2188.
Annot., 16 A.L.R. 1013 (1922).
10 See cases cited note 12 supra; Philbrick, supra note 12, at 173 & n.155.
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